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This paper focuses on the associations between the inflation forecasts of the central 
bank and inflation expectations of the households. The first part is of a descriptive nature. It 
gives the theoretical background of modern monetary policy focusing on the role of 
expectations. It also presents the idea of inflation forecast targeting. Then the framework of 
the inflation forecast targeting in four countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania is presented. The empirical part of the study is an attempt to find associations 
between the inflation forecasts results and inflation expectations of consumers derived on the 
basis of surveys. The theory gives sound background for the existence of such relationships. 
The interdependences are tested in several ways. The last part of the paper focuses on the 
results and conclusions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
According to the broadly accepted consensus (so-called New Neoclassical Synthesis, 
NNS), shared by central bankers and academics, modern monetary policy should have a 
forward-looking character. The fact that today’s situation is decisive for future results of the 
economy, including price development, implies that inflation expectations and inflation 
forecasts play an important role in monetary policy. The importance of forward-looking 
components in monetary policy results also from the fact that monetary authorities can affect 
economy with lags. 
There are a few discussion areas on the role of inflation expectations and forecasts in 
monetary policy. Some of them show a close relationship between these variables. First of 
all, inflation expectations should influence the behavior of economic agents (pricing 
decisions), while inflation forecasts or policy path announcement itself should have an impact 
on expectations. The latter will be evaluated empirically in this paper. Secondly, inflation 
expectations and inflation forecasts, being the most important information variables in a 
forward-looking analysis, support a decision-making process of the monetary policy 
committees. The expectations are a reliable predictor of future inflation. The forecast shows 
the most probable development of the economy consistent with the central bank’s view on the 
economy structure and the transmission mechanism. Thirdly, monetary authorities want to 
influence inflation expectations and inflation forecasts as this helps to govern price 
development. 
Therefore, the importance of inflation expectations and inflation forecasts of central 
banks is not questionable. Several authors focus on this issue showing its theoretical and 
empirical aspects. Some of them focus on the nature of inflation expectations (Forsells, 
Kenny 2004) and their role in inflation dynamics also in New Member States (Gábriel 2009, 
Benkovskis 2008). 
In this paper, inflation expectations and inflation forecasts are analyzed jointly. One 
argues that inflation forecasts ought to help to shape inflation expectation of the economic 
agent. On the other hand, inflation expectations serve as an input into the inflation forecast. 
The paper contributes to a broader analysis of the forward-looking attitude of these central 
banks which implement both direct inflation targeting (DIT) as well as inflation forecast 
targeting (IFT). 
The paper also concerns the discussion on transparency of monetary policy which is 
an immanent part of DIT strategy. The forecasts’ disclosure should increase the monetary 
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policy predictability, which limits the volatility of the interest rates. It should also anchor 
inflation expectations more precisely - foster the central bank’s control over markets’ 
expectations. However, there the optimal level of transparency is not unambiguously 
determined. The research does not give a simple answer to the question whether it is sufficient 
to reveal the forecast, or whether the policy path should also be revealed. 
This paper focuses on the relationship between inflation forecast and inflation 
expectations of households measured on the basis of surveys conducted. Two hypotheses are 
presented. The first one assumes that the interdependences between the inflation forecast 
results and consumers inflation expectations exist. There are theoretical and qualitative 
premises of such existence. The second hypothesis implies that the existence of the 
associations between the inflation forecasts and inflation expectations depends neither on 
detailed solutions in the field of forecasting inflation applied by central banks nor on their 
attitude towards inflation forecast targeting implementation. 
The territorial scope of the research covers four European economies: the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. All of them are countries with derogation, 
implementing DIT strategy and using interest rate as the main monetary policy instrument on 
the macroeconomic and operational level. Their central banks produce inflation forecast and 
use it as an input in a decision-making process. Four central banks covered by the study claim 
that they accept the NNS frameworks. It implies the acceptance of inflation expectations’ 
importance and the forward-looking character of inflation. They also use inflation 
expectations in formalized forecasting process. Nevertheless, the differences in these central 
banks practices are substantial and they impose the character of the research: a case study, 
limited in some cases by the data availability, precedes a comparative analysis. 
The central banks in question started to publish inflation forecasts between 2001 and 
2005. For each central bank the research starting point is the date of the first forecast 
relevance
1. The examination period finishes with the end of 2010. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 focuses on the role and importance of 
inflation expectations in modern monetary policy; Section 3 shows the idea of inflation 
forecast targeting; the fourth part of the paper presents the background of inflation forecasting 
in the four countries covered by the examination; Section 5 describes the methodology of the 
research and the results themselves; Section 6 presents the interpretation of the empirical 
results and the final part draws conclusions.
                                                 
1 The Czech National Bank (CNB) and the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) published the forecast for the first 
time in 2001, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) - in 2004 and the National Bank of Romania (NBR)  - in 2005.  
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2. Modern monetary policy and inflation expectations 
 
The New Neoclassical Synthesis is a broadly accepted consensus on monetary policy 
and its impact on economy. It integrates the classical elements with Keynesian approach 
(imperfect competition and nominal rigidities) and Real Business Cycles models. The NNS 
frameworks were described in literature (Mankiv 1990, Goodfriend, King 1997, Galí 2002). 
The conclusions on monetary policy impact on the economy are as follows (Goodfriend, King 
1997): 
-  monetary policy actions can have an important influence on the real economy, 
which can persist over several years due to gradual adjustment of individual prices 
and general price level; this monetary nonneutrality is caused by the presence of 
rigidities in the economy, 
-  there is little long-run trade-off between inflation and real activity, even if price 
adjustment is costly, 
-  eliminating inflation brings significant gains because of increased transaction 
efficiency and elimination of relative price distortion, 
-  credibility plays an important role in understanding monetary policy. 
Inflation dynamics is directly connected with modern transmission mechanism 
perception. The NNS models emphasize the forward-looking nature of inflation. This 
property is the result of a price setting model which is in line with Calvo model. The model 
assumes that the prices cannot be reset continuously and price revision is non-synchronous. 
Each price setter is allowed to change its price at the random chosen moment. The probability 
of this change in period t is independent of the moment of the last price change and it is also 
independent across the firms. A firm knows that the change of price may not be possible in 
the following period. That is why a company is assumed to set its price taking into account 
the expected average price and the state of the market (excess demand) in the future (Calvo 
1983). Firms re-setting their prices nowadays recognize that the prices they choose are likely 
to remain effective for more than one period. Such firms will find it optimal, when making 
their current pricing decisions, to take into consideration their expectations regarding future 
cost and demand conditions. Since changes in the aggregate price level are (by definition) a 
consequence of current pricing decisions inflation must be an important forward-looking 
component. That property appears to be clearly reflected in the so-called New Keynesian 
Phillips curve (Galí 2002), formally the New Phillips Curve, which is presented by the 
inflation equation given below: Modern monetary policy and inflation expectations
National Bank of Poland 10
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t = Et{t+1}+ kxt + t  
where: 
t – current inflation figure, 
Et{t+1}- inflation expected for the next period, 
xt – output gap, 
t – random disturbance. 
 
The output gap is directly connected with the marginal costs in economy
2. The 
average markup is the ratio of price level to marginal cost for an average firm. It depends on 
the productivity and the cost of labor and materials. Because of the fact that price adjustment 
is costly and is not possible at any time, firms consider changing their product prices only if 
demand and cost conditions threaten to compress or elevate actual markups significantly and 
persistently with reference to flexible-price profit-maximizing levels. Firms consider 
increasing products prices if the marginal cost moves above trend because labor productivity 
falls below its trend, or if strong aggregate demand increases the intensity of resource 
utilization and thereby causes wage or materials costs to rise relative to trend. Conversely, 
firms consider cutting product prices if labor productivity rises relative to trend, or if weak 
aggregate demand relaxes resource utilization and thereby causes wage or materials costs to 
fall relative to trend. To sustain low inflation, monetary policy must manage aggregate 
demand while taking aggregate productivity into account, so that marginal cost rises at the 
targeted rate of inflation — then firms will raise product prices at the targeted rate of inflation 
because they are confident that doing so will keep actual markups at flexible-price profit-
maximizing markups (Goodfriend 2007). 
The inflation equation shows also the importance of inflation expectations. In a 
standard transmission model an aggregate demand channel is accompanied with the 
expectations channel that allows the central banker to affect inflation expectation, which, in 
turn, affects inflation both directly and indirectly (via wage and price-setting behavior) as 
inflation equation shows (Svensson 1998). Knowing that price readjusting may not be 
possible in the next period, firms are taking into account not only the current level of 
aggregate demand but also the expected one. It brings the necessity to shape market 
expectations in the way in which interest rates, inflation and income for the following periods 
                                                 
2  The  output  gap  concept  in  NNS  models  differs  form  traditional  approach.  Output  gap  is  proportional  to 
deviations of the real marginal cost form steady state. In other words, it is the deviation of output form its 
equilibrium level in the absence of nominal rigidities.  Modern monetary policy and inflation expectations
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will be consistent with the central bank goals. If it is possible for a central bank to affect 
expectations, this should be an important tool of stabilization policy. The fact that prices may 
remain unchanged for some time naturally implies that firms must be forward-looking, 
assessing not just the current economic environment but also the outlook for the future. Not 
only expectations about policy matters, but very little else matters. The ability of a central 
bank to influence expenditure, and hence pricing decisions, is crucially dependent upon its 
ability to influence market expectations regarding the future path of overnight interest rate, 
and not merely their current level (Woodford 2003). 
Regarding this theoretical background, the modern monetary policy strategy focuses 
on expectations stabilization. One potential benefit from a successful implementation of 
inflation targeting is the anchoring of expectations with its stabilizing effect on 
macroeconomic activity. Failing to anchor expectations might result in undesired fluctuations 
and economic instability (Eusepi, Preston, 2007). Well-anchored expectations help obviously 
in achieving inflation target with less volatility in the real sphere. 
The short overview on modern monetary policy and its role in the economy shows that 
the expectation channel is the most important transmission channel. Simultaneously, it is the 
most difficult to be modeled formally. The first, and the most important question is how to 
support shaping private sector expectations. Policy commitment and proper communication 
with the market, including inflation forecast publishing, are a possible choice in this field. 
The fact that the frameworks of monetary policy are being rethought nowadays is 
worth noticing. The NNS does not close the discussion on monetary policy. The associations 
of the inflation forecast and expectations may be influenced by drawbacks of this framework, 
which is described in the last section of this paper. The idea of inflation forecast targeting
National Bank of Poland 12
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3. The idea of inflation forecast targeting 
 
The inflation forecast is an immanent part of a fully-fledged direct inflation targeting 
strategy (DIT). A central bank produces its own forecasts, uses them in decision-making 
process and reveals them. Inflation targeting, which is perceived to be the best monetary 
policy strategy by the consensus of NNS, may become inflation forecast targeting (IFT), 
where inflation forecast is an intermediate objective of monetary policy. One argues that 
subscribing the function of an intermediate target to the inflation forecast simplifies 
implementing and monitoring monetary policy (Svensson 1996). The idea of IFT has been 
broadly described in the literature. The main threads of this discussion are presented below. 
Inflation forecast targeting is a simple rule of monetary policy. The central bank’s 
inflation forecast for the period of inflation forecast targeting horizon becomes an 
intermediate target. Hence the instrument should be set so as to make the inflation forecast 
equal to the inflation target. If the inflation target is above (below) the target, the main rate of 
the monetary policy should be raised (lowered). Following this rule is claimed to be the best 
central bank’s practice. Ex post inflation may differ from the targeted level because of 
forecast errors (Svensson 1996). The decision-making procedure of IFT is repeated by the 
monetary committee at any decision point. The forecasts and interest rate level are brought up 
to date if it is necessary. This is why IFT becomes a dynamic optimization procedure. 
Two version of IFT may be discussed. The first one assumes that inflation forecast 
targeting horizon is equal to the inflation control lag (the shortest period when a central bank 
can affect inflation). Only one choice will be optimal for the monetary policy if the central 
bank has only one argument in its loss function (inflation). Within such a strict DIT strategy, 
the central bank in period t should choose a sequence of current and future main rates so as to 
minimize the loss function (the expected squared deviations of the future inflation rate form 
the inflation target). Instead of minimizing the expected squared deviations of the future 
inflation rate from the inflation target, the central bank can minimize the squared deviation of 
the current forecast within the forecast-targeting horizon from the inflation target (Svensson 
1996). 
The other version occurs when inflation forecast targeting horizon is longer that the 
inflation control lag. Right now the policy path is not unambiguously determined. The policy 
can become more contradictory (or lax) sooner or later. This is why the additional restriction 
is put on the policy – constant interest rate condition. The interest rate is now set at the rate 
which, on the assumption that it is kept constant throughout the forecast-targeting horizon, The idea of inflation forecast targeting
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will ensure that the inflation forecast is on target. If the inflation forecast at the forecast-
targeting horizon is not on target, assuming that the prevailing interest rate level is given, the 
interest rate is exactly adjusted to correct this (Leitemo 2006). Under forecast targeting, the 
central bank first constructs conditional inflation, output-gap, and interest-rate forecasts 
corresponding to alternative feasible policies, and then chooses the preferred scenario 
according to the specified loss function (Svensson, Woodford 2002). This procedure assumes 
that the central bank has more than one goal, however, price stability can be a priority. 
The central bank inflation forecast can be perceived as a quite good intermediate 
target. It is by definition a current variable which is the most correlated with the final goal, it 
is more controllable than the final goal, and it can be made more observable. It can also be 
made very transparent and facilitate the central bank’s communication with the public 
(Debelle 1997, Svensson 1996). Moreover, inflation forecast integrates a broad set of 
historical and current data as well as expectations. It means that one variable – the forecast – 
includes the idea of analyzing various data, simultaneously giving the simplicity of following 
an intermediate target commitment. 
Inflation forecast as an intermediate target may fulfill internal and external functions. 
The former is connected with supporting decision procedures of a monetary committee. 
Inflation forecast targeting gives a simple rule of monetary policy, which has already been 
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showed by a credible central bank may limit the expectations’ growth (Skoepa, Kotlán 
2003). Publication of the forecast gives also the central bank a chance to ex post explanation 
and justification of its actions. However, the forward-looking dimension of revealing the 
forecasts seems more important. 
Nowadays, the pros of publishing forecasts seem to prevail. Formal models, as well as 
empirical studies (Chortareas, Stasavage, Sterne 2002) show that publishing forecasts could 
improve macroeconomic outcomes (reduction of the inflation bias, lower inflation rate, loss 
function minimalization). The central bank accepts the importance of expectations in its 
policy and finds the forecasts a useful tool of shaping these expectations. 
The majority of studies show advantages of revealing the forecasts. However, this 
does not mean that there are no drawbacks. A central bank can be bound more tightly by the 
publication of an inflation forecast than is actually warranted by the quality of that forecast. In 
practice a forecast cannot amount to a complete summary of all the information relevant to 
monetary policy decisions. This is mainly because there is no universally optimal forecasting 
method. The specification of the macroeconometric model used for forecasting contains a 
number of degrees of freedom. Moreover, some assumptions also have to be made regarding 
the exogenous variables (Remsperger, Worms 1999). Another problem is that 
macroeconometric models cannot adequately capture structural changes. Recognizing 
transmission mechanism and access to the long enough and reliable set of data can also be 
problematic. 
These problems concern first of all the economies and central banks in transitory 
periods. The four countries covered by the examination first abandoned central planning. 
Then, having finished some stage of disinflation process and after implementing a traditional 
strategy for some time, they adopted  the DIT strategy. Finally, they started to produce and 
reveal inflation forecasts. These changes, taking place during quite a short period, meant 
enhanced structural changes (entrance to the European Union meant it as well) and new 
demands for the monetary policy with adopting new frameworks. This is why, even if the 
central banks see and accept the advantages of using inflation forecast in the monetary policy, 
they may postpone implementing of IFT. European Central Bank’s example shows, that even 
a central bank that implements modern monetary policy strategy may not accept the forecast 
as the most valuable input in the analysis. 
There are theoretical papers that show that this knowledge transparency might be 
socially harmful if the central bank possesses private information about real shocks. The idea of inflation forecast targeting
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(Gersbach 2003). There are others that show that transparency is beneficial up to a certain 
extent (Cecchetti Krause 2002, Jensen 2001). 
Despite these augments disclosure of inflation forecast is broadly claimed to be the 
accepted level of transparency. Central banks publish their own forecast in different ways 
(numerical results, fan chart with probability distribution, risk assessment, description of the 
situation). However, at the beginning, usually just after making decision of DIT 
implementation, they may prefer implicit IFT. It means that the forecast is not revealed as 
long as the central bank is not satisfied with its reliability, however, this very forecast is 
discussed by the monetary committee during the decision process. 
This conclusion does not close the discussion on the desired transparency level. The 
term inflation forecast includes unconditional forecast as well as conditional forecast 
(projection). The latter implies assumption that the central bank does not change the level of 
its interest rate throughout the forecast horizon. The differences between conditional and 
unconditional forecasts and their implications for the central bankers open another discussion. 
And again, no unambiguous solution is elaborated. 
Research on the advantages of conditional or unconditional forecast does not give 
simple results, it usually depends on the assumptions that lay beneath the model. Some of it 
shows that only the publication of the projections reduces uncertainty about inflation target 
and enhances the central bank to built its reputation. In addition, it gives the central bank 
greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy (Geraats 2001). Other research, on the 
other hand, gives contradictory results, showing that unconditional forecasts include all the 
information from which the policy target can be inferred (Tarkka, Mayes, 1999). 
The choice of the unconditional forecast opens the possibility to disclose the most 
likely future evolution of the central bank’s interest rate. It can be done in a descriptive way 
(qualitatively) or quantitatively (on the fan chart). There is an empirical analysis that shows 
that the communication of future policy intentions, either quantitative or qualitative, improves 
the ability of market participants to predict monetary policy decisions (Ferrero, Secchi, 2007). 
The central bank can go further and publish also a policy path which is the sequence 
of current and expected settings of the policy rate, consistent with achieving its goals. 
Formulating and communicating a policy path is the next frontier in monetary policy 
transparency (Khan 2007). Neither theory nor formal models show a sound and unambiguous 
justification for publishing a policy path. However, several pros of publishing policy path are 
connected with the context of shaping expectations. The idea of inflation forecast targeting
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Firstly, communicating a policy path may help demonstrate central banker’s 
commitment to long-term goals, showing the way in which they can be achieved. If such a 
commitment helps to built longer-term expectations, temporary shocks on inflation are less 
likely to transform into persistently higher expectations. As a result, the policy path disclosure 
helps to enforce optimal policy (Khan 2007, Archer 2005). 
Secondly, the policy path announcement can also contribute to shaping short-term 
expectations. Announcing inflation target should first of all anchor medium and longer term 
expectations, which is consistent with the monetary policy horizon. When the inflation is 
above the target, the short-term expectations can be above the central bank desired level. The 
policy path should anchor them more explicitly than just the forecast of inflation. It limits the 
near-term concern about monetary policy actions. It allows the market to price more 
efficiently financial assets, both short-term and long-term ones. Announcing the policy path 
may give the policymakers greater leverage over the long-term interest rates (Khan 2007). 
Moreover, disclosing a policy path explicitly may enforce the forecasts quality as well 
as it improves the central bank’s accountability. Without the information on the future path of 
the economy only ex post evaluation of the central bank is possible (Mishkin 2004). Due to 
the lags in the monetary policy, the monetary policy committee term may be over when its 
actions influence the economy. The arguments in favor of publishing a policy path are also 
supported by a theoretical analysis. 
Despite the arguments that show that the policy path publishing can bring benefits, 
minority of the central banks – inflation targeters - have decided to do so. There are a few 
reasons why. 
First of all, they do not have such a path (Khan 2007). While the policymakers may 
have a sense of direction of the future policy rate changes, in most cases they do not reach 
agreement on an explicit policy path. The problem occurs not only in the area of choosing the 
monetary policy rule, which can be quite controversial,
3 but also because of the inconsistency 
of the decision making procedures with giving an explicit policy path for the period longer 
that the interval between monetary policy committee meetings. It is not possible, and 
reasonable, to make binding decision on an interest rates path instead of a one-step change. 
There is empirical research that confirms that the forecasts of interest rates had little or no 
                                                 
3 Usually the Taylor–type rule is applied as the monetary policy committee reaction function. It has several 
disadvantages that are described in (Taylor Interest…1999). Despite these pitfalls the effort was taken to make 
Taylor-type rules operational. The Taylor-type rules in forward-looking version are broadly applied in central 
banks’ formal models. They can be quite good prescriptive tools if the models are well micro-founded.  
 
  12 
Firstly, communicating a policy path may help demonstrate central banker’s 
commitment to long-term goals, showing the way in which they can be achieved. If such a 
commitment helps to built longer-term expectations, temporary shocks on inflation are less 
likely to transform into persistently higher expectations. As a result, the policy path disclosure 
helps to enforce optimal policy (Khan 2007, Archer 2005). 
Secondly, the policy path announcement can also contribute to shaping short-term 
expectations. Announcing inflation target should first of all anchor medium and longer term 
expectations, which is consistent with the monetary policy horizon. When the inflation is 
above the target, the short-term expectations can be above the central bank desired level. The 
policy path should anchor them more explicitly than just the forecast of inflation. It limits the 
near-term concern about monetary policy actions. It allows the market to price more 
efficiently financial assets, both short-term and long-term ones. Announcing the policy path 
may give the policymakers greater leverage over the long-term interest rates (Khan 2007). 
Moreover, disclosing a policy path explicitly may enforce the forecasts quality as well 
as it improves the central bank’s accountability. Without the information on the future path of 
the economy only ex post evaluation of the central bank is possible (Mishkin 2004). Due to 
the lags in the monetary policy, the monetary policy committee term may be over when its 
actions influence the economy. The arguments in favor of publishing a policy path are also 
supported by a theoretical analysis. 
Despite the arguments that show that the policy path publishing can bring benefits, 
minority of the central banks – inflation targeters - have decided to do so. There are a few 
reasons why. 
First of all, they do not have such a path (Khan 2007). While the policymakers may 
have a sense of direction of the future policy rate changes, in most cases they do not reach 
agreement on an explicit policy path. The problem occurs not only in the area of choosing the 
monetary policy rule, which can be quite controversial,
3 but also because of the inconsistency 
of the decision making procedures with giving an explicit policy path for the period longer 
that the interval between monetary policy committee meetings. It is not possible, and 
reasonable, to make binding decision on an interest rates path instead of a one-step change. 
There is empirical research that confirms that the forecasts of interest rates had little or no 
                                                 
3 Usually the Taylor–type rule is applied as the monetary policy committee reaction function. It has several 
disadvantages that are described in (Taylor Interest…1999). Despite these pitfalls the effort was taken to make 
Taylor-type rules operational. The Taylor-type rules in forward-looking version are broadly applied in central 
banks’ formal models. They can be quite good prescriptive tools if the models are well micro-founded.  
 The idea of inflation forecast targeting
WORKING PAPER No. 105 17
3
  12 
Firstly, communicating a policy path may help demonstrate central banker’s 
commitment to long-term goals, showing the way in which they can be achieved. If such a 
commitment helps to built longer-term expectations, temporary shocks on inflation are less 
likely to transform into persistently higher expectations. As a result, the policy path disclosure 
helps to enforce optimal policy (Khan 2007, Archer 2005). 
Secondly, the policy path announcement can also contribute to shaping short-term 
expectations. Announcing inflation target should first of all anchor medium and longer term 
expectations, which is consistent with the monetary policy horizon. When the inflation is 
above the target, the short-term expectations can be above the central bank desired level. The 
policy path should anchor them more explicitly than just the forecast of inflation. It limits the 
near-term concern about monetary policy actions. It allows the market to price more 
efficiently financial assets, both short-term and long-term ones. Announcing the policy path 
may give the policymakers greater leverage over the long-term interest rates (Khan 2007). 
Moreover, disclosing a policy path explicitly may enforce the forecasts quality as well 
as it improves the central bank’s accountability. Without the information on the future path of 
the economy only ex post evaluation of the central bank is possible (Mishkin 2004). Due to 
the lags in the monetary policy, the monetary policy committee term may be over when its 
actions influence the economy. The arguments in favor of publishing a policy path are also 
supported by a theoretical analysis. 
Despite the arguments that show that the policy path publishing can bring benefits, 
minority of the central banks – inflation targeters - have decided to do so. There are a few 
reasons why. 
First of all, they do not have such a path (Khan 2007). While the policymakers may 
have a sense of direction of the future policy rate changes, in most cases they do not reach 
agreement on an explicit policy path. The problem occurs not only in the area of choosing the 
monetary policy rule, which can be quite controversial,
3 but also because of the inconsistency 
of the decision making procedures with giving an explicit policy path for the period longer 
that the interval between monetary policy committee meetings. It is not possible, and 
reasonable, to make binding decision on an interest rates path instead of a one-step change. 
There is empirical research that confirms that the forecasts of interest rates had little or no 
                                                 
3 Usually the Taylor–type rule is applied as the monetary policy committee reaction function. It has several 
disadvantages that are described in (Taylor Interest…1999). Despite these pitfalls the effort was taken to make 
Taylor-type rules operational. The Taylor-type rules in forward-looking version are broadly applied in central 
banks’ formal models. They can be quite good prescriptive tools if the models are well micro-founded.  
 
  13 
informational value when the horizon exceeded two quarters (six months), although they were 
good in the next quarter and reasonable in the following one (Goodhart, Bin Lim, 2011). 
Moreover, the risk or uncertainty temporarily connected with the forecast as well as with 
policy path can be substantial. 
Secondly, the public may perceive a given policy path as a commitment. Market 
participants will adjust their behavior to the new conditions and economic outlook more 
sluggishly. They can feel cheated by the central bank if its subsequent decisions on the 
interest rate are different from the announced policy path. From the central bank’s point of 
view, the latter may create limited willingness to change a policy path which was once 
announced, even if the forecast changes. Such an approach may limit the flexibility of the 
central bank (Khan 2007). There is also another problem connected with perceiving a policy 
path as a commitment. It can influence credibility negatively if the public does not understand 
conditional nature of such a path (Woodford 2005). 
A theoretical analysis shows that gains from disclosing the path of the future interest 
rate by central banks that have already engaged in publishing macroeconomic projections may 
be lower than those achieved after embarking on disclosing macro-projections and 
macromodels on the basis of which these projection were made. Weighted against the fears of 
revealing the future interest rate path, this may explain the reluctance of certain central banks 
to push their transparency framework that far (Brzoza–Brzezina, Kot, 2008). 
However, to underline the ambiguity of the results described above, the results of the 
other research – empirical one this time - is worth mentioning. The study (Ferrero, Sccheci 
2007) shows that even for a very transparent central bank (Reserve Bank of New Zealand), 
the publication of the expected interest rate path has a significant impact on market 
expectations. Moreover, the change in market interest rates in the period between two 
publications of the interest rate path was similar to the revision of the published path, thus 
suggesting that market operators well understood the conditionality of the central bank’s 
projections. 
The discussion on transparency and its optimal level means nowadays deliberations on 
central bank’s forecast relevance as well as publishing other information connected with 
forecasting procedures (assumptions, model, errors, risk assessment, policy path). 
Transparency is beneficial when it serves to simplify communication with the public and 
helps generate support for central banks to conduct the monetary policy optimally with an 
appropriate focus on long-run objectives. However, it can complicate the communication 
process and weaken support for a central bank focus on long-run objectives (Mishkin 2004). The idea of inflation forecast targeting
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The optimal level of transparency cannot be easily determined. The theoretical discussion on 
this issue is still in progress. The central banks’ practices in this field are not unique and their 
choices are justified differently. However, the transparency level of monetary policy is largely 
aligned. The public knows the main goal, instruments and main premises of the decision 
making process, including forecasts. Moreover, the monetary authority explains the decision 
which has just been made. The differences are mainly connected with the intentions of future 
actions demonstration. 
The countries covered by the examination also implement different solutions in this 
field, which is described in the next section.Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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4. Inflation forecast targeting in practice 
 
This section examines practical aspects of inflation forecasting procedures and the 
related institutional framework in four central banks: the Czech National Bank (CNB), the 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH), the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the National Bank 
of Romania (NBR). They all declare the acceptance of the NNS frameworks, including the 
importance of inflation expectations and the role of forecast in the monetary policy. Table 1 
presents the main facts on forecasting systems and procedures in the countries covered by the 
study. 
The implementation of DIT strategy is a precondition of the IFT implementation
4. 
Direct inflation targeting strategy can be implemented in various ways. It means that within 
the set of standard features of such a strategy, the central bank can operate in different 
frameworks and implement diverse solutions at an operational level. This brings 
consequences for IFT. This is why the starting point for the analysis focuses on selected 
aspects of monetary policy strategy.  
One remarkable feature for the monetary policy implementation is the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Fully-fledged DIT implies a floating exchange rate. However, the 
intermediate solutions are also acceptable. Such a temporary situation may reveal 
inconsistency in the MPC behavior. If the central bank declares that the forecast is an 
important premise in a decision making process and the forecast is revealed, the public will 
understand that the decision on interest rates is not in line with the forecast. It undermines the 
declaration on forecast importance and lowers its significance as a tool that helps shaping 
inflation expectations. Such an ambiguous situation occurred in Hungary and Romania. 
In Hungary DIT was declared to be the official strategy of the NBH in 2001. 
However, a fixed exchange rate with the fluctuation band of 15% around the central parity 
was introduced in October 2001 and abandoned in February 2008. It meant an about 7-year-
period of coexistence of fixed exchange rate with inflation targeting. Despite the NBH 
declaration of DIT implementation, its strategy was quite eclectic. It had numerous features of 
DIT (numerically set inflation target as the priority, inflation forecast, independence and 
accountability of the central bank, communication with the public). At the same time the 
Bank Board quite often reacted to the exchange rate of forint fluctuations, which meant that 
the forecast was neglected. 
                                                 
4 Inflation forecast can be produced even within another monetary policy strategy frameworks but it therefore 
fulfill different tasks. The role of forecast as the intermediate objective is therefore negligible. 
  15 
4. Inflation forecast targeting in practice 
 
This section examines practical aspects of inflation forecasting procedures and the 
related institutional framework in four central banks: the Czech National Bank (CNB), the 
National Bank of Hungary (NBH), the National Bank of Poland (NBP) and the National Bank 
of Romania (NBR). They all declare the acceptance of the NNS frameworks, including the 
importance of inflation expectations and the role of forecast in the monetary policy. Table 1 
presents the main facts on forecasting systems and procedures in the countries covered by the 
study. 
The implementation of DIT strategy is a precondition of the IFT implementation
4. 
Direct inflation targeting strategy can be implemented in various ways. It means that within 
the set of standard features of such a strategy, the central bank can operate in different 
frameworks and implement diverse solutions at an operational level. This brings 
consequences for IFT. This is why the starting point for the analysis focuses on selected 
aspects of monetary policy strategy.  
One remarkable feature for the monetary policy implementation is the choice of 
exchange rate regime. Fully-fledged DIT implies a floating exchange rate. However, the 
intermediate solutions are also acceptable. Such a temporary situation may reveal 
inconsistency in the MPC behavior. If the central bank declares that the forecast is an 
important premise in a decision making process and the forecast is revealed, the public will 
understand that the decision on interest rates is not in line with the forecast. It undermines the 
declaration on forecast importance and lowers its significance as a tool that helps shaping 
inflation expectations. Such an ambiguous situation occurred in Hungary and Romania. 
In Hungary DIT was declared to be the official strategy of the NBH in 2001. 
However, a fixed exchange rate with the fluctuation band of 15% around the central parity 
was introduced in October 2001 and abandoned in February 2008. It meant an about 7-year-
period of coexistence of fixed exchange rate with inflation targeting. Despite the NBH 
declaration of DIT implementation, its strategy was quite eclectic. It had numerous features of 
DIT (numerically set inflation target as the priority, inflation forecast, independence and 
accountability of the central bank, communication with the public). At the same time the 
Bank Board quite often reacted to the exchange rate of forint fluctuations, which meant that 
the forecast was neglected. 
                                                 
4 Inflation forecast can be produced even within another monetary policy strategy frameworks but it therefore 
fulfill different tasks. The role of forecast as the intermediate objective is therefore negligible. Inflation forecast targeting in practice
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Inflation forecast targeting in practice
WORKING PAPER No. 105 21
4
  17 
In Romania, a floating exchange rate regime was functioning before the DIT 
implementation. The Romanian case was the example of the existence of the discrepancies 
between de jure and de facto regime, so called “fear of floating”. It describes the situation 
where regimes de jure are more flexible than de facto, as the country follows unofficial 
exchange rate target usually in the period of large macroeconomic imbalance and low foreign 
reserves to adopt an official peg (Nerlich 2002). After the DIT introduction in 2005, the 
exchange rate regime became more floating, however, NBR still reacted sometimes to the 
exchange rate changes. 
In the Czech Republic and Poland direct inflation targeting was introduced in the late 
nineties. Before its introduction, Czech koruna had already operated in a managed floating 
regime. The forecast disclosure started in August 2001. Since 2001 DIT strategy in the Czech 
Republic has been a fully-fledged version. 
In Poland a floating exchange rate was introduced in 2000 after a short period of DIT 
implementation. At that time the inflation forecast was not published. In Poland the interval 
between the DIT introduction and the first forecast disclosure was quite long, as the first 
projection was published in August 2004. 
The forecasting procedures in the countries covered by the study evolved over time. 
The main forecasting tool – the model – was first a quite simple tool that integrated all the 
relevant data. It also provided consistent frameworks for the analysis (Analytical Schemes, 
MAPM). Structural changes in national economies (i.e. caused by the access to the European 
Union), in global economy, as well as the development of econometrics resulted in changes of 
the main forecasting tools. The most developed tool used in the countries covered by the 
study is the g3 model of the Czech National Bank. The g3 is a Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium Model. DSGE models belong to the fourth generation of macromodels describing 
the monetary policy impact on the economy. They are perceived as the most advanced 
methodological approach in macromodeling. However, one argues that they have numerous 
drawbacks (for further description see: Tovar 2008). All models used for forecasting and 
policy analysis, regarding their complexity and scale, capture monetary transmission 
mechanism that lies within the frameworks of New Neoclassical Synthesis. 
Nevertheless, a forecast is not the outcome of an automatic modeling procedure. 
Experts’ involvement is necessary as forecasting is an iterative process. Experts’ opinions 
prevail in the short term. They better capture temporary shocks occurring in the economy. On 
the other hand, models describe longer term relations in a better way. This is why the central Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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bank forecast is usually a combined forecast: main models’, experts’ and sometimes forecast 
produced with an additional tool. 
Experts involved in forecasting procedures are central bank staff. However, the 
expression central bank forecast does not specify who the author of the forecast is. The 
forecast may incorporate the view of the staff and the MPC members. This situation occurs in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania. In Romania the Board Members are even 
involved iteratively. It means consultations between the staff and the Board on subsequent 
stages of the forecasting round. The forecast produced with an iterative involvement of the 
MPC members incorporates to a large extent their view on the future course of the economy. 
And they are the ones who make decisions on interest rates, which means that these decisions 
are tailored on the basis of their opinion. As a consequence, the forecast is a less objective 
premise of a decision making process. On the other hand, a decision should be in line with the 
forecast message as it simplifies the communication with the market. 
In Poland the Monetary Policy Council members are not involved in the forecasting 
process. They have no impact on the forecast which is produced by the staff and discussed 
during the MPC meeting. No-involvement case also creates a problem as the MPC members 
may not share the view of the staff on the economic development. As a result, they will not 
react in the way suggested by the forecast. It may dampen the forecasts’ impact on the 
expectations of economic agents. 
Taking into consideration the alternatives described above, one might argue that 
discrete involvement of monetary policy committee constitutes a satisfactory compromise. In 
fact, it does not. The involvement of MPC members seems to have no impact on the 
consequence in IFT implementation. The National Bank of Hungary implemented the same 
solution as the Czech National Bank (discretionary involvement). The first one does not 
follow the message of the forecast, while the second one does it with a surprising consistency 
even in a turbulent period for the financial markets (Szyszko 2009). It seems that there are 
some other, qualitative aspects which seem to be decisive. One of them could be the belief of 
the MPC that the forecast is the best supporting tool of a decision-making process or the 
pressure from the central bank’s staff which has equipped the MPC with such a tool. 
The second part of the descriptive analysis focuses on inflation forecast targeting 
implementation in the countries in question.  Table 2 presents a summary of the comparison 
of the IFT implementation. Four features are considered: formal declaration on the importance 
of inflation forecasts, consistency of the decision of the MPC with the inflation forecast result, 
decision timing and finally – the way in which the decisions on interest rate were justified.  Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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Table 2. Inflation forecast targeting implementation  
  The Czech 
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Source: own work 
 
Forecast disclosure is usually a part of the communication strategy. Forecast appears 
in the Inflation Report. This document presents a broader context of the monetary policy in 
order to provide the public with information relevant for the decision-making process. 
Inflation forecast targeting is not dependable on detailed solutions on forecasting procedures 
and forecasts disclosure. As it was shown in table 1 and described above, the systems of 
forecasting inflation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania differ. Regardless 
of the details, revealing the forecast by the central bank is always perceived as a part of a 
communication strategy that should help to build transparency and hence anchor expectations. 
This is also the reason why central banks give the rationale for their decision. Usually central 
banks explain also why the forecast is made and published. This declaration should show the 
importance of the forecast as the rationale for interest rate adjustments. 
The Czech National Bank declares on its website that the forecast for inflation at the 
“monetary policy horizon” (about 12–18 months ahead) is of greatest relevance to the 
decision-making on the current interest rate settings. In its monetary policy decision-making 
the CNB Bank Board assesses the latest CNB forecast and evaluates the risks of non-Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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fulfilment of this forecast. Based on these considerations the Bank Board then votes on 
whether and how to change the settings of monetary policy instruments. By changing these 
instruments the central bank seeks to offset excessive inflationary or disinflationary pressures 
which are deviating future inflation from the inflation target or from the tolerance band 
around this target. The first declaration on the forecast importance was given in the CNB 
Monetary Strategy Document that was published in 1999. It was stated there that the key 
source material for the CNB Bank Board's decisions would be the CNB's macroeconomic 
forecast. The central bank of the Czech Republic gave quite a clear picture of the forecast role 
in the monetary policy. 
The National Bank of Hungary, at the beginning of DIT implementation, declared 
explicitly that inflation forecast played the role of the intermediate target (Monetary Policy in 
Hungary, 2002). This was quite an unambiguous statement, showing a strong involvement in 
IFT. In 2010 new information appeared on the website: In taking its policy decisions, the 
Monetary Council takes into account the baseline path of the NBH staff's projection, the 
uncertainty around it and risk scenarios that are judged to be relevant. However, decision-
making is not a mechanical exercise, as the Monetary Council may give consideration to 
other aspects, in addition to the NBH staff's projection. The latest version demonstrates much 
less importance of the inflation forecast in a decision making process. At the same time it is 
more consistent with the behavior of the Hungarian Monetary Council. 
In Poland the rationale for projections and their publication was given for the first time 
in 2004, when the first projection was published. It was limited to the short note in the 
Inflation Report saying that the projection is one of the inputs to the Monetary Policy 
Council’s decision-making process. Monetary Policy Strategy document (Monetary Policy 
beyond 2003) was published in 2003 – before the first projection disclosure. The projections 
and their role in the monetary policy, however, were not mentioned. Starting form 2005, 
Monetary Policy Council refers to the projections in Monetary Policy Guidelines. In the latest 
ones it was stated that monetary policy is pursued under uncertainty which excludes strict 
control of economic processes. This uncertainty means that while taking decisions related to 
monetary policy it is necessary to take into account all available information relevant for 
inflation developments, rather than the results of inflation projection only. Models used by 
central banks to forecast inflation may be imperfect in adequately reproducing behavior of 
the economy if only because of its ongoing structural changes. In addition, it is not possible to 
adopt a simple policy rule which could be known ex ante to market participants (Monetary 
Policy Guidelines 2010). This declaration shows that in Monetary Council’s opinion the Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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projection is not a primary input in a decision making process. It is taken into consideration 
but has an equal position as the other data. Moreover, it is emphasized that this projection 
could temporarily be of little importance (rationale for decision-making during the financial 
crisis). 
The National Bank of Romania presents on the Bank’s website only one quite a 
laconic piece of information on inflation forecast importance. It says that the forecasts 
generated by the model are a very important input in the NBR Board's policy decision 
making. There is neither monetary policy strategy document nor yearly published information 
on monetary policy assessment. However, just before implementation of the new monetary 
frameworks in 2005 an effort was made to ensure completion of the models for the analysis 
and short and medium-term forecasting of inflation. They were to be used as an input for the 
monetary policy decision-making. Annual Reports confirm the declared role of the inflation 
forecast. 
It is remarkable that the central banks underline first of all the internal function of the 
forecast: supporting the decision-making of the MPC. The theory as well as empirical 
research focus on external functions – shaping inflation expectations. Forecast disclosure 
accompanied with the declaration that it will be quite an important input in a decision-making 
process certainly opens the possibility of fulfilling external functions of the forecast - the 
central bank can guide the market indirectly via expected instruments adjustments. 
The declaration on the forecast importance is not sufficient for the market participants, 
however, it can serve as the starting point. If the forecast is to be taken into consideration 
while making decisions by market participants, the central bank has to prove that it really 
implements IFT. The authorities’ declarations, including monetary authorities, may not be 
reflected in their behavior. Therefore, publishing the forecast will be of little importance for 
shaping market expectations. Bearing that in mind the assessment of central bank’s credibility 
is quite difficult. It would mean the answer to the question whether inflation forecast is really 
the input for the decision-making process. This would be the research of mostly qualitative 
nature, having numerous limitations: 
-  there is no possibility to measure formal declaration on forecast importance; main 
input in a decision-making process, greatest relevance to the decision-making, not 
automatic exercise – these are purely descriptive expressions, 
-  the latest declaration of the HNB and the NBP as well as the CNB and the NBR 
has almost the same meaning from the linguistic point of view; however, it does 
not mean that the CB’s intentions were the same, Inflation forecast targeting in practice
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-  assessment of IFT should show a broader context of communication with the 
market; it is not the situation were the rule of IFT was not implemented that is 
important but the reason why and the frequency of such behavior; IFT is closed 
loop policy, which means ex ante allowance for not following the rule in a specific 
situation, no automatic procedure is ever possible; but those situations where the 
IFT is not followed should be rare and well accounted for, 
-  sometimes there is no simple solution given by the message of the forecast; it is 
connected with the attitude of the central banks to the DIT strategy; they 
implement rather flexible inflation targeting; which means in practice that there is 
an accepted fluctuation band around inflation target; the CB shows commitment to 
the main goal but simultaneously it sends a message that the inflation level that 
would be above or below the target may be temporarily accepted, especially when 
it is due to exogenous shocks (sometimes the list of caveats is presented); not 
focusing on economic shock supports output stabilization; for the IFT 
implementation this flexibility means that sometimes there is more than one option 
of the MPC decision that can be perceived as being in line with the message of the 
forecast. 
Because of the limitations presented above, the examination of IFT implementation 
may not lead to unambiguous results. Qualitative analysis of the practice of the four central 
banks in question can give the results presented briefly below and summarized in table 2. 
The Board of Czech National Bank was very consistent in IFT implementation. It 
followed the message of the forecast. When it did not - it was clearly explained why. Usually 
the reason lied beyond the impact of the central bank
5. If there was a need for the interest rate 
change, CNB did not hesitate to do so when the forecast was the most up to date without 
taking wait and see position. Moreover, the communication with the public focused on the 
forecast, policy path and risk assessment. Balance of the risk for the forecast was presented 
even in those months when the new forecast did not appear.  
Different attitude was presented by the Hungarian Monetary Council. For several 
years, the NBH claimed that the forecast is its intermediate target. At the same time the 
projection was neglected as the input for the decision-making process. The official interest 
                                                 
5 In April 2003 the message of the forecast suggested that there should be no change of interest rates. The rates 
were cut in June. The CNB explained that the wrong assumption on time and extent of direct tax change was 
made. In the meantime the government postponed the changes. Similar situation took place in January 2006. The 
exchange rate appreciation was stronger that expected. It meant more tight monetary condition than planned 
without interest rate rise. 
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rates changes were mainly caused by exchange rate fluctuations. Sometimes other current 
factors were decisive. The projection seemed to be only an additional input in the decision-
making process. The flexibility which is allowed by fluctuation band around the inflation 
target gives freedom not to change rates or to change them in the direction suggested by the 
forecast. The National Bank of Hungary often changed them in the direction opposite to the 
message suggested by the forecast
6. Such behavior was inconsistent with the strong 
declaration on the projections importance. In 2010 the declaration was changed. 
Simultaneously, it seems that the Monetary Council has been slowly changing its attitude 
since managed floating exchange rate introduction. Starting from February 2008 only once the 
decision was not in line with the forecast message. 
In Poland the Monetary Policy Council proved a rather eclectic approach to choosing 
the input of a decision-making process. Its decisions were generally in line with the message 
of the forecast. It might be inferred then that when there is a tolerance band around inflation 
target, deviation of projected inflation from the targeted level within transmission horizon is 
often within the band. The MPC can choose whether the reaction is worth producing. 
However, there are two important issues proving that the projection was not of primary 
importance: the moment of the decision-making and its explanation. Firstly, the projection 
was produced quarterly and from 2008, 3 times a year. Just after it was produced it was the 
most relevant. During the next 2 or 3 MPC meetings, the projection became stale. But at the 
same time there was a possibility of assessing whether the assumptions were right. When the 
MPC implements IFT consistently it usually makes a decision in line with the forecast 
message instead of taking wait and see position. The rationale behind the decision also did not 
focus on the projection.  
The National Bank of Romania had similar attitude as the National Bank of Poland. 
However, the starting point of the analysis was a little bit different, what should be underlined 
while comparing the central banks under examination. In Poland the forecast was revealed for 
the first time in the sixth year of DIT implementation. As a consequence, the central bank had 
already finished implementing new operational frameworks. Simultaneously, market 
participants got used to the interest rate policy and its signaling effects. In Romania the 
forecast was disclosed just after the introduction of the new monetary frameworks. The 
operational level of the monetary policy was still being adjusted. The impact of NBR 
                                                 
6 16 times between August 2001 and the end of 2010 the message of forecast was ignored. The rationale for 
interest rate change referred sometimes directly to the speculative attacks on Hungarian forint. Usually there was 
no reference to the forecast in the rationale for the decision. The other reasons were underlined (risk premium 
change, demand pressure, imbalance of the Hungarian economy). 
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measures on short term interest rates was assessed as unsatisfactory. This was the first reason 
why the Bank Board decisions were not in accordance with the message of the forecast. The 
second reason was connected with an eclectic approach to the data analysis. Sometimes the 
Board simply decided that current data are more important. Between August 2005 and the end 
of 2010 the Board reacted in the counter-forecast direction 3 times. It also took wait and see 
position and the forecast was not the central point in decision rationale.  
This section gave the background for empirical study. Simultaneously, it was the 
starting point for verifying the second hypothesis: the central banks under examination apply 
different forecasting rules, proving at the same time different approach to the decision-making 
input. Market participants can quite easily asses the importance of the forecast in decision 
making procedures as well as its reliability. Then they decide whether the forecast should be 
taken into consideration while shaping the expectations. The next section presents the results 
of a quantitative study on the relationships between inflation forecast and expectations. 
However, it can be stated as the summary of this section, that the existence of this kind of 
relationships depends strongly on qualitative aspects, including the central bank’s attitude and 
consistency in IFT implementation. In some countries preconditions for these relationships 
are fulfilled while in others – they are not. Preliminary conclusion that can be drawn here 
implies that the relations between inflation forecasts and expectations should be the strongest 
in the case of the CNB and the weakest in the case of Hungarian central bank.  Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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5. Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations 
 
The existence of associations between the inflation forecast and inflation expectations 
of households is empirically verified in this section. This section describes the data, 
methodological issues and finally, it presents the results of the study. However, a few general 
remarks need to be presented beforehand. 
First of all, the data availability limits the research perspective. Unique information on 
forecasts and expectation, except balances, for the four countries in question simply does not 
exist. Each central bank presents the forecast differently. Only the information that is 
published may influence expectations. A similar problem – limited accessibility of the time 
series - concerns inflation expectations, measuring of which changed over time. 
For each country two sets of variables are analyzed: one on the forecast message and 
the other – on inflation expectations of economic agents (first of all – consumers, business 
expectation case is included for the Czech Republic). Because of the reason described above 
they do not cover exactly the same time series. The idea was to use the data that has similar 
informational value. However, in certain cases, especially for the Czech Republic, additional 
information is used (policy path). It results form the fact that the divergences in forecasting 
procedures, in the way of publishing forecast and in the expectations measurement exist.  
The associations between the forecast results and expectation are tested in a few areas. 
Obviously, the correlation does not bring any information on the causality. The theoretical 
underpinnings suggest that the forecast should influence expectations, but the correlation 
refers to any statistical relationships. However, a priori no result can be expected, and 
moreover – cannot be indicated as a proper one. It can be only assumed that there should be a 
statistically important relationship between these two variables. Even the existence a of 
negative correlation can be interpreted: for example, when the forecast shows that inflation is 
above the target but the goal is exceeded less than the last forecast suggested, the expectations 
may fall. Another example is connected with a conditional forecast: when the central path is 
above the target and the society understands the conditionality of the forecast, it will expect 
the main rate to rise and its inflation expectation may fall.  
 
5.1 Inflation forecast results 
 
There is no unique information on inflation forecast that is accessible in the four 
countries. To make the data comparable and to enable the use of the longest time series 
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possible, the information on the forecast result is processed to present forecast result in a 
qualitative way. The relation between the inflation forecast result and the inflation target at 
the horizon of t+4Q is taken into consideration. It is the most coherent with the way in which 
the expectations of economic agents are measured in surveys (which will be described 
further). The suggested way of coding inflation forecast results is also coherent with the way 
how the forecast is presented in the media. Consumers do not usually read Inflation Reports 
or central banks’ documents. They learn the forecast results indirectly. Analytics present the 
message of the forecast referring to the relation of the forecast and the central bank goal.  
Two cases were distinguished. The first one – and simpler – assumes three 
possibilities: 
-  the forecast is below the inflation target; 
-  it is at the inflation target level; 
-  it is above the inflation target. 
This version (henceforth referred to as 3 possibilities case) does not account for the 
situation when the central path shows that the target will be missed but at the same time the 
inflation rate will remain within the accepted fluctuation band and the situation when central 
path is below or above lower or upper boundary of the fluctuation band. Meanwhile, the 
inflation targeters usually implement flexible inflation targeting. This means that they accept 
fluctuation around the targeted level of inflation. It limits output fluctuations giving the 
central bank possibility not to react in case of certain shocks (usually predefined and 
published). This is why for the second case the message of the forecast is simplified to five 
possible positions of the central path of the forecast in relation to the inflation target at the 
horizon t+4Q (henceforth referred as 5 possibilities case): 
-  it is below the upper boundary of the fluctuation band; 
-  it is below the inflation target but within the fluctuation band; 
-  it is at the target level; 
-  it is below the lower boundary of the fluctuation band; 
-  it is below the inflation target but within the fluctuation band. 
The other approach could also be tested: the direction of the change in the central path. 
However, it has a remarkable drawback in comparison with the first approach that is 
connected with the nature of forecasting tools. The forecasting models are general equilibrium 
models. In the long run inflation as well as the other economic variables return to equilibrium 
level, which means – in the case of inflation – the targeted level of it. Usually, when 
transmission horizon starts the shocks that influence the economy at the starting point of the Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
WORKING PAPER No. 105 31
5
  26 
possible, the information on the forecast result is processed to present forecast result in a 
qualitative way. The relation between the inflation forecast result and the inflation target at 
the horizon of t+4Q is taken into consideration. It is the most coherent with the way in which 
the expectations of economic agents are measured in surveys (which will be described 
further). The suggested way of coding inflation forecast results is also coherent with the way 
how the forecast is presented in the media. Consumers do not usually read Inflation Reports 
or central banks’ documents. They learn the forecast results indirectly. Analytics present the 
message of the forecast referring to the relation of the forecast and the central bank goal.  
Two cases were distinguished. The first one – and simpler – assumes three 
possibilities: 
-  the forecast is below the inflation target; 
-  it is at the inflation target level; 
-  it is above the inflation target. 
This version (henceforth referred to as 3 possibilities case) does not account for the 
situation when the central path shows that the target will be missed but at the same time the 
inflation rate will remain within the accepted fluctuation band and the situation when central 
path is below or above lower or upper boundary of the fluctuation band. Meanwhile, the 
inflation targeters usually implement flexible inflation targeting. This means that they accept 
fluctuation around the targeted level of inflation. It limits output fluctuations giving the 
central bank possibility not to react in case of certain shocks (usually predefined and 
published). This is why for the second case the message of the forecast is simplified to five 
possible positions of the central path of the forecast in relation to the inflation target at the 
horizon t+4Q (henceforth referred as 5 possibilities case): 
-  it is below the upper boundary of the fluctuation band; 
-  it is below the inflation target but within the fluctuation band; 
-  it is at the target level; 
-  it is below the lower boundary of the fluctuation band; 
-  it is below the inflation target but within the fluctuation band. 
The other approach could also be tested: the direction of the change in the central path. 
However, it has a remarkable drawback in comparison with the first approach that is 
connected with the nature of forecasting tools. The forecasting models are general equilibrium 
models. In the long run inflation as well as the other economic variables return to equilibrium 
level, which means – in the case of inflation – the targeted level of it. Usually, when 
transmission horizon starts the shocks that influence the economy at the starting point of the 
  27 
forecast horizon vanish. The new ones cannot be captured by the model. As a consequence, 
the path of inflation after 4-6 quarters returns to the inflation level. For the countries that miss 
the target it means usually that the central path of inflation falls. 
The other shortcoming of this approach is that it does not capture the relation of 
central path and the target. When the inflation is supposed to rise, it can rise from the level 
below the lower boundary of the fluctuation band as well as from the level above the target or 
even the upper boundary. The impact on the expectations should be different in both cases. 
The additional solution is applied in the case of the Czech National Bank. It produces 
an unconditional forecast. It means that together with the central path of the forecast, a policy 
path is described in Inflation Reports. This is the reason why, for this country, the direction of 
change of the policy path in the period following the disclosure is also taken into 
consideration. 
The length of the sample is also different for different countries. The details are given 
in table 3. 
 
5.2 Inflation expectations 
 
The theoretical discussion on monetary policy and its impact on the economy shows 
the priority of shaping the expectations in the actions of the central bank. It has already been 
emphasized that they can be treated as an unbiased predictor of future inflation as well as an 
indicator of the central bank’s credibility. However, inflation expectations, especially those of 
a household, cannot be directly observed. There are two ways of measuring inflation 
expectations. The first one consists of conducting economic surveys on a regular basis
7. The 
survey is of a qualitative nature. Consumers do not give the exact level of expected inflation 
but they answer questions on their inflation perception
8 and expectations
9. Then the answers 
can be used in two ways. First of all the balance of answers is calculated: 
 
B = (PP + ½P) − (½M + MM) 
                                                 
7 The second one consists of deriving inflation expectations from the prices of financial assets, which is not 
subject of this paper. 
8 The question is: How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 months? And the 
answers to chose from: They have…risen a lot, risen moderately, risen slightly, stayed about the same, fallen, 
don't know. 
9 The question is: By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop 
in the next 12 months? And the answers to chose from: They will…increase more rapidly, increase at the same 
rate, increase at a slower rate, stay about the same, fall, don't know.    27 
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where PP denotes the percentage of respondents who chose the option “the most positive” 
(consumer prices have risen a lot for the inflation perception and they will increase more 
rapidly for expected inflation); P denotes “moderately positive” answer (consumer prices 
have risen moderately for inflation perception and they will increase at the same rate for 
expected inflation); M - the percentage of respondents who chose the “moderately negative 
option” (consumer prices stayed about the same for inflation perception and they will stay 
about the same for expected inflation); MM - the percentage of respondents who chose the 
option “very negative” (consumer prices have fallen for inflation perception and they will fall 
in next 12 months for expected inflation) (The Joint… 2007). That balance values range from 
−100, when all the respondents choose the most negative option to +100, when all the 
respondents choose the most positive one. 
This kind of survey is made monthly by the European Commission. It covers the new 
member states as well: the Czech Republic from 1995, Hungary from February 1993, Poland 
and Romania from May 2001. The balance of answers presented in Business and Consumer 
Surveys Results does not directly measure the inflation expectations, thus it cannot be 
interpreted in a straightforward way. When it is positive it means that the number of 
respondents who expected prices to increase more rapidly over the next 12 months than in the 
past exceeded the number of those who expected prices to remain the same or increase more 
slowly that in the past. When the indicator (balance) of expected inflation turns negative, it 
suggests that the number of respondents who expect prices not to rise over the next 12 months 
is higher than the number of those who expect prices to remain the same or increase more 
rapiddly than in the past. This is how the balance has been presented and interpreted by the 
Czech National Bank in its Inflation Reports since April 2007. 
The balances from Business and Consumer Surveys are directly used as the source of 
information on inflation expectations. Despite the drawbacks described above (they sill do not 
measure directly inflation expectations as well as they are not easily interpreted) they have 
quite an important advantage. The same data with the time series longer than time series for 
inflation forecast are accessible for all the countries covered by the examination. At the same 
time, balances can represent roughly the perception of expected inflation by households. 
Two different approaches, except for balances, to expectations are considered: the 
level of expectations (derived form qualitative surveys or central banks surveys with 
quantitative question) and the direction of its change.  Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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The structure of the answers to the surveys’ question can be quantified using Carlson–
Parkin method of quantification (described in Łyziak 2003). The quantification is done in two 
steps. First, the perceived inflation rate is quantified, then using the perceived inflation, the 
expected inflation can be also quantified. Quantified data on inflation expectations have been 
available for Poland monthly since 1992. These data are also an input to the research. 
However there is no obligation of expectations quantification on the national level. The 
central bank may asses expectations in surveys based on quantitative question: household 
sector respondents are asked about their inflation expectations at chosen horizon, usually 12-
month horizon. The CNB and the NBH collected information on expectations in this way up 
to 2007. This procedure was unsatisfactory for the reasons why it is not applied to 
households: their awareness of current economic situation as well as of inflation target is 
limited. Qualitative questions are easier for consumers. The expectations measured in purely 
quantitative way are volatile. This is why this way of measuring expectations was abandoned. 
No national survey has been conducted in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. The European 
Commission data are used and presented in Inflation Report but only in a descriptive manner, 
using the balance for perceived and expected inflation. However, the direction of the change 
in inflation expectations of the households is explicitly presented. 
 
Table 3. Data availability and time extent  
  The Czech Republic  Hungary  Poland  Romania 
Inflation forecast 




2001Q2-2010Q4  2001Q3-2010Q4  2004Q3-2010Q4  2005Q3-2010Q4 
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Source: own study. 
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The CNB still conducts quarterly, quantitative surveys among companies. This is why 
the examination for the Czech Republic covers also business inflation expectations
10. Only for 
the Czech case two groups’ expectations are covered.  
For Romania no information except for balances calculated in the EC surveys is 
available. The national surveys only refer to financial market expectations. 
Table 3 presents details on expectations and forecasts that were examined for each 
country with their time extent. Three approaches to expectations are applied: 
-  unique data delivered by EC surveys on balances of answers on expected inflation, 
the national data on quantified expectations of households (and business for the 
Czech Republic), 
-  the direction of expectation change that was described in Inflation Reports.  
The surveys results, quantified or presented as the balance of answers, have also 
another shortcoming. They reflect feelings of consumers rather than their real behavior driven 
by expectations. The latter is better reflected in financial market assets change. Regardless of 
this drawback, surveys are commonly used to asses expectations by central banks.  
 
5.3 Versions of the analysis 
 
Table 4 and 5 present pairs of variables whose relationships are tested for each 
country. Table 4 presents the relations tested for balances of answers. In the case of the Czech 
Republic the associations for the central path are additionally tested. The remaining pairs are 
the same for each country.  
The question on lags appears at this point. The forecast is produced with lower 
frequency than the surveys on expectations are made. From the theoretical point of view, the 
forecast should be one of the most decisive signals affecting inflation expectations. However, 
this signal is issued only at a low frequency and can therefore become stale over time. As a 
result, financial market participants are likely to increasingly base their views on private 
information. In this case, market volatility may increase (Ehrmann, Sondermann 2009)
11. In 
the light of these study results, the influence of inflation forecast on expectations should be 
                                                 
10 The research focuses on consumers expectations. Having time series on business expectations, it was worth to 
use them and compare with the results for households.  
11 This study focuses on reaction of UK short-term interest rates to the Bank of England’s inflation report and to 
macroeconomic announcements on the one hand, and to the interrelationship between the two on the other hand. 
The authors proved on the basis on stylized model that macroeconomic announcements and the release of the 
inflation  report  clearly  lead  to  a  reduction  in  market  volatility.  This  suggests  that  public  signals  serve  to 
homogenize the information sets of market participants, thus reducing the role of private information.  
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the strongest when the lag is quite short. Two lag options (1M and 2M) are tested wherever it 
is possible
12. Due to the timing of the survey and the inflation forecast publications, no-lag 
version was not tested. 
 
Table 4. Versions of association tested for balances of answers 
Quarterly: 
Central path (5 possibilities) /balances 1M lag 
Central path (5 possibilities) /balances 2M lag 
Central path (3 possibilities) /balances 1M lag 
Central path (3 possibilities) /balances 2M lag 
Central path (5 possibilities)/ average balance 1M lag 
Central path (5 possibilities)/ average balances 2M lag 
Central path (3 possibilities)/ average balance 1M lag 
Central path (3 possibilities)/ average balances 2M lag 
Policy path (3 possibilities) /balances 1M lag 
Policy path (3 possibilities) /balances 2M lag 
Policy path (5 possibilities)/ average balance 1M lag 
Policy path (5 possibilities)/ average balances 2M lag 
Monthly: 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/balances 1M lag 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/balances 2M lag 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/balances 1M lag 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/balances 2M lag 
Policy path repeated/ balances 1M lag 
Policy path repeated/ balances 2M lag 
Italics shows relations tested only for the Czech Republic 
Source: own study 
 
Quarterly, (which is presented in diagram 1), the forecast result (5 or 3 possibilities) is 
confronted with: 
-  the balance that was calculated on the basis of the next month survey, 
-  the balance that was calculated on the basis of the survey that took place 2 months after 
the forecast was revealed, 
-  the average of balance that was calculated on the basis of the next month survey and 
two subsequent balances (quarterly average), 
-  the average of balance that was calculated on the basis of survey that took place 2 
months after the forecast was revealed and two subsequent balances (quarterly average). 
                                                 
12 It seems reasonable to check the existence of the associations with longer lag for Poland starting form 2008, 
when the frequency of the forecast was lowered. However, the time series would be quite short here, which is 
why the idea was dropped.  
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The first and the second options check whether there is an association between the 
inflation forecast result and the expected inflation (balance of answers) covering only one 
survey. One or two month lag is assumed. The third and the fourth options assume that the 
forecast result affects the structure of answers to the question on expected inflation up to the 
time when the new forecast is revealed. Again the lag is assumed
13.  
 
Diagram 1. The associations presented quarterly 
 
Source: own study. 
 
With the balances of the answers given with lower frequency that the forecast result 
the alternative approach is also tested – the forecast result is repeated for the two (or three, it 
depends on the forecast frequency) subsequent months and is assumed to influence the 
answers separately in each month (repeated version, also referred to as monthly approach). 
The time series on balances of answers on the survey questions were the same for four 
countries. As the time series on the level and the direction of expectations differ, the 
associations tested also cover various versions: 12 for the Czech Republic, 4 for Hungary, 20 
for Poland (table 5).   
                                                 
13 I.e. July forecast result is confronted with the quarterly average balances calculated for August, September and 
October (1 month lag) or calculated for September, October and November. It means the assumption that the 
households need at least a month to read the message of the forecast. 
Forecast A 
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The restriction on lags is placed due to surveys frequency. In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary the survey was held a month before the forecast disclosure. As a consequence, in 
each case where the lag is not described, 2M lag is considered. Still, for Poland having 
monthly observation on expectation, a similar approach as with the balances is applied. 
 
Table 5. Versions of association tested for level and directions of expectations change 
  Association tested 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change  
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of business expectations change  
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of business expectations change  
Policy path/direction of consumers expectations change 
Policy path/direction of business expectations change 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (limited to 2007Q2) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/ business expectations 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (limited to 2007Q2) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/business expectations 
Policy path/ consumers expectations (limited to 2007Q2) 
CNB 
(12) 
Policy path/ business expectations 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (limited to 2007Q3) 
NBH 
(4) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (limited to 2007Q3) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (2Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (2Mlag) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/ average consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/ average consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/ average consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/ average consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (1Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (1Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (2Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change (2Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag) 
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
NBP 
(20) 
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag) 
Source: own study 
 
The Hungarian case presents the basic scope of the research. The associations between 
the relation of the central path and the inflation target (described as central path) in two 
versions (5 and 3 possibilities) are tested with inflation expectations (levels up to 3Q2007, 
direction of the change). The case of the Czech Republic covers also additional cases: 
associations of policy path and expectations as well as business expectations. In Poland 
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having the time series of monthly frequency was confronted with the forecast that was made 
quarterly or 3 times a year. This is why in Polish case a few approaches were applied. They 
were the same as while testing relations for balances of answers.  
The poorest access to the data for Romania means that only the correlation of the 
inflation forecast and balances of answers was tested.  
 
5.4 Measures applied 
 
The correlation between inflation forecast and expectations measures a degree of 
monotonic association between these two variables. This is one of the simplest statistical 
relations, however, here it is imposed by the range of data availability that also implies that 
only non-parametric correlation measures can be used. The diagram with the statistical 
measures of association is presented below. A range of measures, depending on the character 
of time series – qualitatively expressed forecast results are accompanied by qualitative 
(directions of change) or quantitative (levels, balances) information on expectations - is used. 
The Spearman and Kendall correlation coefficients are suitable for the situation where the 
data are in the form of ranks or are on ordinal scale. A chi-square test and related statistics can 
be used when data are enumerative (counts or frequencies). The statistical hypotheses that are 
to be tested are also presented in diagram 2. 
Under a null hypothesis there is no monotonic association between inflation forecast 
results and expectations or the two variables are independent for  = 0.05. It should be noticed 
that inflation forecast results as well as inflation expectations are expressed in terms described 
in the previous part of this section. It does not necessarily mean their levels. 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is the basic measure of associations that can 
be used here regardless of the way in which the expectations are expressed. It is the only 
measure applied in the case of testing relations between inflation forecast and balances of 
answers. The rationale for using other measures in the case of levels of expectations and the 
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Diagram 2. Statistics and range of associations tested  
 
Source: own study.  
 
5.5 Results and comments 
 
The results are presented in tables 6-11. They are divided into 3 groups. The starting 
point is testing associations between the inflation forecast results and expectations expressed 
as the balances of answers on survey questions. As the same time series presented in Business 
and Consumer Surveys Results by the European Commission are available for the four 
countries, this time the Romanian case can be covered as well as the three others. This 
approach offers greater comparability of results. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 
given it table 6.  
 
Statistics  
The Spearman Rank 
Correlation Coefficient (rs) 
Chi-Square Test for 
Independence  
Kendall Tau 
 Correlation Coefficient () 
Forecast expressed as the 
relation to the goal. 
Expectations – levels. 
Both variables of qualitative 
nature (ordinal scale): 
− forecast – relation to the goal, 
− expectations – directions. 
H0: s = 0 
H1: s  0 
 
H0:  = 0 
H1:   0 
 
H0: the inflation forecast and 
inflation expectations are 
independent of each other. 
 
H1: the inflation forecast and 
inflation expectations are 
dependent. 
 
Forecast expressed as the 
relation to the goal. 
Expectations – balances. 
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Regardless of the broad range of the associations tested, none of them proved to be 
statistically important for the significance level of 5% in the case of the CNB. The null 
hypothesis is thus not rejected. This result is quite interesting considering preliminary 
assumption that the association here should be quite strong because of consistency of the 
CNB in IFT implementation. Chart 1 shows the time series for central path for 3 possibilities 
(left scale) and quarterly average of balances with 1M lag (right scale). The inconsistency 
between the time series appears to be the strongest from 2002 to 2004. A few explanations 
can be given. First of all, the introduction of unconditional forecast in mid-2002 might have 
changed the perception of the forecast. However, an almost 3-year-period seems to be too 
long for learning how to interpret the forecast. The second explanation is connected with the 
way in which the CNB formulated the main goal up to the end of 2005: only the range for 
inflation was given. This is not consistent with expressing inflation forecast result in 5 
possibilities, which would explain the lack of relations. On the other hand, it is consistent with 
3 possibilities and none of these options proved to be statistically important as well. 
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   Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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Regardless of the broad range of the associations tested, none of them proved to be 
statistically important for the significance level of 5% in the case of the CNB. The null 
hypothesis is thus not rejected. This result is quite interesting considering preliminary 
assumption that the association here should be quite strong because of consistency of the 
CNB in IFT implementation. Chart 1 shows the time series for central path for 3 possibilities 
(left scale) and quarterly average of balances with 1M lag (right scale). The inconsistency 
between the time series appears to be the strongest from 2002 to 2004. A few explanations 
can be given. First of all, the introduction of unconditional forecast in mid-2002 might have 
changed the perception of the forecast. However, an almost 3-year-period seems to be too 
long for learning how to interpret the forecast. The second explanation is connected with the 
way in which the CNB formulated the main goal up to the end of 2005: only the range for 
inflation was given. This is not consistent with expressing inflation forecast result in 5 
possibilities, which would explain the lack of relations. On the other hand, it is consistent with 
3 possibilities and none of these options proved to be statistically important as well. 
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Table 7. The associations between policy path and balances for the CNB 
   N  rs  t(N-2)  p 
Quarterly         
Policy path / balances t+1  34  0.57  3.88  0.000 
Policy path / balances t+2  34  0.30  1.78  0.084 
Policy path / average balances t+1  34  0.38  2.32  0.027 
Policy path / average balances t+2  34  0.34  2.05  0.048 
Monthly         
Policy path repeated/ balances t+1  102  0.40  4.36  0.000 
Policy path repeated/ balances t+2  102  0.36  3.82  0.000 
Statistically important associations are bolded. 
Source: own calculations. 
 
The third explanation is connected with the nature of unconditional forecast. In the 
case of unconditional forecast it is the policy path that may guide market expectations 
directly. The Spearman rank correlation coefficients for policy path and balances are 
presented in table 7. The coefficients are statistically important in 5 out of 6 cases and their 
strength is moderate. It means that the consumers in Czech Republic take into consideration 
the policy path, not the forecast itself, which is in line with the central bank’s intentions. 
However, the coefficients are positive. In the case of the Czech Republic the decisions where 
in line with the policy path. Considering at least a month lag, it would mean that the results 
show the correlation between the decision of the MPC and the balances of the answers.  
However, the policy path explanation is not the only possible one. Previously 
described options consisting in searching for possible explanation for the period 2002-2004 
are also valuable in the light of the additionally tested relations. The same pair of variables 
was tested for the case of the CNB for the period 2005-2010. Here the relations between 
inflation forecast results and balances exist and have moderate strength, whereas for the 
policy path they are even stronger (around 0.7). 
In Hungary the monotonic association between the inflation forecast results and the 
balances of answers to the survey questions on expected inflation exists. The Spearman rank 
correlation coefficients are positive, but the strength of association is moderate, around 0.5 for 
every pair of variables. Again the result is surprising, regarding the practice of the HNB. This 
time the explanation seems to be simpler: the consumers may not perceive the projection as 
the tool of deriving the next step of the monetary authorities but rather as an indicator of the 
future inflation. When the forecast is above the target the expectations (here balances) rise. 
The households do not expect the central bank to dampen inflation.  
 In Poland, only the associations of variables analyzed monthly are statistically 
important, however, they are quite week. The strength is consistent with the practice of the 
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NBP. The forecast is the decisive input neither in a decision-making process nor in 
communication of its rationale. Moreover, the frequency of the forecast was reduced. 
Regardless of the sound explanation of the central bank of such a step, it manifests that the 
forecast is probably loosing its importance in Polish monetary policy.  
In Romania three out of four associations given in monthly cycle and 3 out of 8 
relations in quarterly cycle are statistically important (positive coefficients of weak or 
moderate strength). These 3 relations assume 1 month lag. Here the interpretation is limited 
because of the reasons that were already described: the NBR operated in different market 
condition than the other banks.  
The next step in quantitative analysis is testing the existence of interdependences 
between inflation forecast results and the level of inflation expectations or their direction of 
change. Table 8 presents the Spearman and Kendal coefficients. The second one can be 
interpreted in the terms of probability of having concordant pairs. Both of them indicate the 
existence (or not) of monotonic association between the two variables. 
 
Table 8. The Spearman rank and Kendall tau correlation coefficients 
Variables:  N  rs  t(N-2)  prs    p 
The Czech Republic 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations  24  0.418  2.157  0.042  0.352  0.016 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change  39  -0.019  -0.113  0.911  -0.007  0.944 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/business 
expectations  39  0.277  1.754  0.088  0.204  0.067 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction 
of business expectations change  39  0.505  3.559  0.001  0.436  0.000 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations  24  0.398  2.034  0.054  0.324  0.026 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change  39  -0.046  -0.278  0.783  -0.035  0.753 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/business 
expectations  39  0.232  1.453  0.155  0.173  0.119 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction 
of business expectations change  39  0.478  3.311  0.002  0.420  0.000 
Policy path/ consumers expectations  19  0.258  1.103  0.285  0.184  0.269 
Policy path/direction of consumers expectations 
change  34  0.084  0.475  0.638  0.075  0.532 
Policy path/ business expectations  34  0.587  4.100  0.000  0.499  0.000 
Policy path/direction of business expectations 
change  34  0.507  3.331  0.002  0.454  0.000 
Hungary 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations   22  0.539  2.865  0.010  0.430  0.005 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change  38  0.136  0.823  0.416  0.120  0.288 Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations   22  0.600  3.355  0.003  0.493  0.001 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change  38  0.097  0.582  0.564  0.091  0.418 
Poland 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations (1Mlag)  22  0.396  1.931  0.068  0.314  0.041 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change (1Mlag)  22  0.609  3.436  0.003  0.553  0.000 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations (2Mlag)  22  0.439  2.183  0.041  0.353  0.021 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change (2Mlag)  22  0.071  0.317  0.755  0.067  0.662 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations (1Mlag)  22  0.227  1.041  0.310  0.179  0.244 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change (1Mlag)  22  0.704  4.430  0.000  0.656  0.000 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/consumers 
expectations (2Mlag)  22  0.294  1.376  0.184  0.238  0.121 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction 
of consumers expectations change (2Mlag)  22  0.101  0.456  0.653  0.093  0.543 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/average 
consumers expectations (1Mlag)  22  0.396  1.931  0.068  0.314  0.041 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/average 
consumers expectations (2Mlag)  22  0.439  2.183  0.041  0.353  0.021 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/average 
consumers expectations (1Mlag)  22  0.227  1.041  0.310  0.179  0.244 
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/average 
consumers expectations (2Mlag)  22  0.294  1.376  0.184  0.238  0.121 
Central path repeated (case with 5 
possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag)  77  0.378  3.534  0.001  0.294  0.000 
Central path repeated (case with 5 
possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (1Mlag) 
76  0.002  0.015  0.988  0.003  0.973 
Central path repeated (case with 5 
possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag)  77  0.376  3.519  0.001  0.300  0.000 
Central path repeated (case with 5 
possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (2Mlag) 
75  -0.059  -0.508  0.613  -0.051  0.519 
Central path repeated (case with 3 
possibilities)/consumers expectations (1Mlag)  77  0.241  2.150  0.035  0.196  0.012 
Central path repeated (case with 3 
possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (1Mlag) 
76  0.069  0.591  0.556  0.062  0.427 
Central path repeated (case with 3 
possibilities)/consumers expectations (2Mlag)  77  0.257  2.306  0.024  0.217  0.005 
Central path repeated (case with 3 
possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (2Mlag) 
75  -0.010  -0.085  0.932  -0.009  0.905 
Statistically important associations are bolded.  
Source: own calculations. 
 
Taking into consideration the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for the Czech 
Republic, 5 out of 12 associations are statistically important, 2 out of 4 for Hungary and 9 out Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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of 20 for Poland. The Kendall tau correlation coefficient gives similar results for the 
significance level of 5% (for the Czech Republic one more relation is statistically important). 
However, the strength of associations is not imposing: a relative indication of the degree of 
association between inflation forecast result and inflation expectation does never approach 1, 
and rarely approaches 0.7. Once it attains 0.704 (the association of the central path, case with 
3 possibilities and the direction of consumers expectations change with1M lag for Poland) . It 
is the strongest relation, considering both measures of rank correlation. The coefficients that 
are statistically important are positive, which means that inflation forecast results and inflation 
expectations are changing in the same direction. 
 
Table 9. Chi-square test for independence - the Czech Republic 
Statistics:  2  df  p 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  9.3426  df=8  p=0.314 

2of the highest credibility  9.2685  df=8  p=0.320 
Cramér's V  0.3461     
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of business expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  12.23724  df=8  p=0.140 

2of the highest credibility  14.63492  df=8  p=0.066 
Cramér's V  0.39609     
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  4.871379  df=4  p=0.300 

2of the highest credibility  5.026195  df=4  p=0.284 
Cramér's V  0.24990     
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of business expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  9.686688  df=4  p=0.046 

2of the highest credibility  11.07218  df=4  p=0.025 
Cramér's V  0.35240     
Policy path/direction of consumers expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  0.64866  df=4  p=0.957 

2of the highest credibility  0.65117  df=4  p=0.957 
Cramér's V  0.09766     
Policy path/direction of business expectations change 
Pearson's 
2  13.18307  df=4  p=0.010 

2of the highest credibility  13.67578  df=4  p=0.008 
Cramér's V  0.44030       
Statistically important associations are bolded.  
Source: own calculations. 
 
The calculation presented in table 8 is consistent with those presented in table 6. For 
the Czech Republic 5 associations are statistically important but only one of them represents 
households expectations. Business expectations were not represented in EC surveys. Here the 
results suggest that there is an interdependence between inflation forecast result and 
expectations of companies. At the same time no relation is found for the consumers 
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expectations except for the central path with 5 possibilities and the levels of consumers 
expectations. There are two interdependences for Hungary, which is not in contradiction to 
previously obtained results – here the expectation comes form own survey of the HNB. For 
Poland 4 version with repeated forecast are statistically important but the relation is of low 
strength which confirms the results obtained for balances. 5 possibilities case for inflation 
forecast is also correlated with average of the inflation expectations for 1M and 2M lag. Two 
other pair of variables (central path with 5 possibilities/direction of expectations change, 
central path with 3 possibilities/ direction of expectations change) are also statistically 
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hypothesis saying that inflation expectations of business depend on the relation of inflation 
forecast to the inflation target can be accepted. However, the interdependences are quite 
weak. 
 
Table 11. Chi-square test for independence - Poland 
Statistics  
2  df  p 
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
(1Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  13.20000  df=8  p=0.105 

2of the highest credibility  16.48927  df=8  p=0.035 
Cramér's V  0.54772       
Central path (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
(2Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  6.678571  df=8  p=0.571 

2of the highest credibility  7.849231  df=8  p=0.448 
Cramér's V  0.38959     
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
(1Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  12.32000  df=4  p=0.015 

2of the highest credibility  15.30433  df=4  p=0.004 
Cramér's V  0.52915       
Central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations change 
(2Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  3.775794  df=4  p=0.437 

2of the highest credibility  5.112453  df=4  p=0.275 
Cramér's V  0.29293       
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (1Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  5.730035  df=8  p=0.677 

2of the highest credibility  5.418060  df=8  p=0.712 
Cramér's V  0.19415       
Central path repeated (case with 5 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (2Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  6.237344  df=8  p=0.620 

2of the highest credibility  5.935405  df=8  p=0.654 
Cramér's V  0.203917       
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (1Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  1.468189  df=4  p=0.832 

2of the highest credibility  1.427284  df=4  p=0.839 
Cramér's V  0.098280     
Central path repeated (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of consumers expectations 
change (2Mlag) 
Pearson's 
2  4.046806  df=4  p=0.399 

2of the highest credibility  3.840728  df=4  p=0.427 
Cramér's V  0.164252       
Statistically important associations are bolded.  
Source: own calculations. 
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Table10 presents the results for Hungary. Only two possible dependences were tested. 
None of them proved to be statistically important. The similar outcome is for Poland (table 
11) where only pair of variables: central path (case with 3 possibilities)/direction of 
consumers expectations change (1Mlag) is depended.  
The chi-square test for independence and measures derived from it offer the possibility 
to test associations between variables that are expressed in an enumerative way. However, 
here the results should be interpreted with caution – in several cases theoretical (expected) 
frequencies of certain events occurrence are lower than 5. The calculations above present only 
a rough picture of the interdependence between inflation forecast and expectations. 
A few general conclusions can be drawn for cross-country comparison. 5 cases version 
does not seem to reflect the association better than 3 cases version of the central path relation 
to the goal. The same is true for lags. However, it should be noticed that in the case of the 
Czech Republic and Hungary (levels and directions) the lag of 2M was imposed. The balances 
of the answers to the survey questions are here the time series that provide the greater 
comparability. In this case no version proved to be more suitable for 4 countries. However, 
the analysis of expectations in terms of the direction of change proved to be the poorest 
solution. 
The Czech Republic case included also business expectations. Here the statistically 
important relationships exist for 4 pairs of variables (levels and directions) whereas there is 
only 1 for consumer expectations (taking into consideration the same set of variables). Better 
understanding of the forecast message and higher reliability of surveys held among companies 
are possible explanations here.  
Testing the associations of the inflation forecast results and the expectations gave no 
unambiguous results. This conclusion should lead to a broader economic interpretation that 
will be given in the next section. Empirical study on the forecast and inflation expectations
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6. How the results can be interpreted 
 
Insofar as the measures applied allow, it can be stated that the theoretical 
underpinnings pointing to the inflation expectations formation being the most important 
function of inflation forecast are not empirically confirmed. If they were, there should be an 
association between the two variables. The interdependences are not statistically important or 
the strength of association is at the most moderate. The empirical study resulted in no 
unambiguous conclusions despite a broad range of measures applied and various pairs of 
variables tested. Simultaneously, the study of the associations between the inflation forecast 
and inflation expectations has a strong justification in theory. There are several reasons why 
the study results may seem unsatisfactory with reference to theory. 
First of all, the theory itself does not seem satisfactory for all researchers. It is 
grounded in the NNS framework which was subject to criticism even before the global crisis 
erupted in 2007. The reproaches inter alia are: weak empirical evidence, unrealistic Calvo 
pricing model, and difficulty in obtaining parameters in New Keynesian Models (Toedter 
2008). One argues that this theory does not determine the price level or the inflation rate 
(Cochrane 2007). There are two alternative views of the central bankers and academics on the 
future development of the central banking discussed. The first one - continuity view – does 
not reject thoroughly the NNS. The central bank, while acknowledging the changes that have 
occurred, interprets them essentially as unusual “shocks” in the context of a fairly stable 
macroeconomic environment or model of the economy. By contrast, in the second, or new-
environment view, the central bank sees recent economic developments as related to and 
reinforcing one another. Taken jointly, they would reflect a qualitative change in the 
macroeconomic environment. Such a change is not so easily captured by economic models 
and can point to a more significant modification to traditional policy guides. Such a central 
bank is more likely to adjust its beliefs regarding the operation of the economy and to make 
corresponding changes in its policy approach (Borio, English, Filardo 2003). The discussion 
on monetary policy framework was enforced by the crisis that revealed some deficiencies in a 
prevailing theory and monetary frameworks. The new consensus in the monetary policy is 
being developed. It is broadly agreed that the way monetary policy transmission is described 
in macroeconomic models needs to be fundamentally reworked. Transmission is 
oversimplified, especially regarding various channels related to financial institutions (Frait, 
Komárková, Komárek, 2011). How the results can be interpreted
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The empirical research does not also confirm the assumption that the economic agents 
form their expectations rationally. That assumption lies beneath the NNS framework. The 
research actually proves that the expectations formation is of a hybrid nature: partly adaptive 
and partly forward-looking (Gerberding 2001, Forsells, Kenny 2002). It confirms that the 
inflation forecast cannot stand for the most important factor in expectations shaping process. 
The composition of expectations is reflected in Hybrid New Keynesian Phillips Curve. 
Simultaneously rational expectations hypothesis is being weaken taking the form of adaptive 
learning hypothesis (Cierkoski 2008). 
The drawbacks of the transmission models are directly connected with the main focus 
of this study. They account for the second reason why the results do not confirm the theory. 
If the model does not capture economic situation properly, the forecast is biased, of which the 
monetary policy committee is aware. It does not perceive the forecast as the main input to the 
decision-making process. This behavior may be intensified temporarily – especially in 
turbulent periods, the MPC may underline the inadequacy of the model. The public realizes 
the inconsistency of the MPC and does not take into consideration the inflation forecast while 
making economic decisions. 
The third reason why the results are not unambiguous is an extension of the second 
one. The MPC may ignore the forecast message for any reason. Not only because it perceives 
the model as inadequate. It may also rely on current issues, especially on exchange rate 
fluctuations as the main inflation determinant while making decisions on interest rates. The 
consequence in inflation forecast targeting is a necessary precondition of fulfilling external 
function (expectations shaping). The three countries covered by the examination did not prove 
to be consistent. 
In this context it is necessary to focus for a while on the Czech Republic case. The 
Czech National Bank really intended to target inflation forecast. Moreover, the forecast was 
exposed in communication with the markets. One can assume that the interdependences 
between the inflation forecast result and inflation expectations should be the strongest in the 
case of the Czech Republic. In fact they are not. There are no statistically important 
associations between the inflation forecast results and balances of the answers to the question 
on expected inflation regardless of the version of the analysis. Chi-square test does not 
confirm the dependence of the inflation forecast result and the expectations as well. The 
Spearman and Kendall tau rank correlation coefficients are statistically important only once in 
the case of households expectations. Only most of the relations regarding business 
expectations are statistically important. The lack of associations for this country can be How the results can be interpreted
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explained with the policy path announcement that should guide market expectations directly. 
The versions with the central path should show negative correlation coefficient assuming that 
the public understand the forecast (rising interest rates will dampen economic activity and 
expected inflation should decrease). In fact the associations proved to be positive.  
Here the fourth reason why the results are not satisfactory appears: the understanding 
of the central bank forecast and its actions by the public. Revealing forecast means only 
increasing the institutional transparency of the central banker. It does not necessarily mean 
that the forecast, especially the projection, is properly interpreted. The way of communicating 
monetary policy stance, the decisions on interest rates as well as revealing inflation forecast 
are also important. The forecast is not published as the single information. It appears at the 
same time as the Inflation Report that includes more information on the central bank’s view 
on the economy. It can influence the expectations as well as the forecast does. Moreover, the 
information published can be perceived as more decisive for the MPC, which has been 
already described. The simultaneity of information publishing is also important: assuming that 
the conditionality of projection is understood, any change of the interest rate makes the 
projection invalid. Here the coefficients are positive. It means that the forecast is not read in 
terms of probable future policy action. It may be connected with the understanding of the 
forecast as well as with the central bank credibility.  
The fifth explanation is connected with the measures of expectations. Surveys results 
regardless of their shortcomings, are commonly used by the central banks and referred to in 
the Inflation Reports. No associations between quantitative surveys on households 
expectations and inflation forecasts could be understood – the surveys were perceived as 
unreliable and this is the reason why they were abandoned in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. However, if only methodological issues lied beneath the results, the 
interdependences of the forecast results and inflation expectations for Poland, where 
consistent data on expectations based are available, should be relatively stronger.  
The sixth reason for not finding sound associations of the two variables may be 
connected with the territorial scope of the research. The time series for the countries covered 
by the examination are relatively short. The central banks still develop forecasting procedures. 
The forecast has been revealed for a few years (especially in Poland and Romania) only. The 
MPCs are not always consistent in IFT implementation, which discourages the public to take 
the forecast into account. 
The hypotheses in the introduction are not confirmed. The first one because of not 
unambiguous results and the second one - stating that the existence of the interdependences How the results can be interpreted
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between the inflation forecasts and inflation expectations does not depend on detailed 
solutions in the field of forecasting inflation applied by central banks – because the firs one is 
not confirmed. The study covers four countries that were chosen due to certain similarities. In 
spite of them, there are numerous divergences, even on the strategy level (exchange rate 
regime) not mentioning the effectiveness of monetary policy. Forecasting tools and 
procedures differ as well. The Czech central bank was the only one to produce unconditional 
forecasts. The central banks seem to put different attention to the message of the forecast. 
None of applied solutions proved to support the relationship between the inflation forecast 
and expectations. Conclusion
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7. Conclusion  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on modern monetary policy strategy and its 
implementation. It focuses on the relation of the inflation forecast results and inflation 
expectations. The expectations of households derived from surveys are taken into 
consideration. There is a sound theoretical background showing the importance of inflation 
expectations in the modern monetary policy as well as the usefulness of the inflation forecast 
in shaping the expectations. These theoretical underpinnings accompanied with the behavior 
of the central banks (producing and revealing inflation forecasts) led to the presentation of 
two hypotheses. The first one assumes that the associations between the inflation forecast 
results and consumers inflation expectations exist. In order to verify the first hypothesis the 
review of the literature and the practice of the central bank is made. The crucial part of the 
study is of an empirical nature – statistically important interdependences between several 
pairs of variables are verified. Such relations were not found or they were of weak or 
moderate strength. The results were similar regardless of the country. This is why the second 
hypothesis assuming that no solution in the field of forecasting inflation may be perceived as 
more appropriate may not be verified. 
Regardless of the barriers of the study, it can be the first step in the direction to 
measure this kind of relations. There are also a few possible extensions of the study: 
extending the territorial scope of the research to countries that implement IFT for a longer 
period of time, quantifying surveys data, and, finally, alternative coding of inflation forecast 
message. The analysis could also take into consideration the credibility of the central bank 
and ex post errors of the forecast. References
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